Diversified Syndicate Structure and Loan Spreads for Non-U.S. Firms by Gopalakrishnan, Balagopal & Mohapatra, Sanket
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Diversified Syndicate Structure and Loan
Spreads for Non-U.S. Firms
Gopalakrishnan, Balagopal and Mohapatra, Sanket
Indian Institute of Management Kozhikode, Indian Institute of
Management Ahmedabad
2 October 2019
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/96297/
MPRA Paper No. 96297, posted 03 Oct 2019 07:38 UTC
Diversified Syndicate Structure and Loan Spreads for
Non-U.S. Firms∗
Balagopal Gopalakrishnan† and Sanket Mohapatra‡§
Abstract
Syndicated lending allows participant banks to offer larger loans for longer
tenors. A diversified syndicate structure, which includes both domestic and for-
eign banks, can aid in reducing their risk and alleviate information asymmetry in
loan contracting. Using cross-country data on syndicated loans obtained by non-
U.S. firms, we find that a diversified syndicate structure is associated with lower
loan spreads for riskier borrowers compared to loans made by non-diversified syn-
dicates. We also find that the positive effect of a diversified syndicate on loan
terms is more pronounced during periods of greater economic policy uncertainty,
when information asymmetry tends to be higher. The baseline findings hold across
subsamples of the data and are robust to alternative specifications and controls
for selection effects. Our findings provide evidence on the benefits of a diversified
syndicate structure in mitigating screening and monitoring costs in bank lending.
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1 Introduction
Syndicated lending involves participation of multiple banks that can facilitate longer-term
lending for larger investment projects. Such loans often include a diversified syndicate
structure consisting of domestic and foreign banks. The participation of domestic banks,
which typically possess more “soft information” about local borrowers, can aid in both
monitoring of borrowers as well as bilateral negotiations at the recovery stage.1 The
discipline imposed by better bank monitoring can help to reduce moral hazard by de-
tecting any private benefits enjoyed by the borrower and taking punitive actions such
as liquidation or renegotiations (Park, 2000). This can potentially lower the spreads
charged to riskier borrowers, who would otherwise require a higher degree of monitoring
to avoid moral hazard issues (Berndt & Gupta, 2009; Diamond, 1991).2 When lending
to such high-risk borrowers, foreign banks may benefit from participating in a diversified
syndicate that also includes domestic banks. In contrast, when lending to lower risk bor-
rowers who require less monitoring, foreign banks in a non-diversified syndicate may be
able to price their loans more competitively as they bring higher technological efficiency
and better service quality (Bonin, Hasan, & Wachtel, 2005; Claessens, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt,
& Huizinga, 2001). In this study, we empirically examine the importance of syndicate
structure in mitigating lender-borrower agency frictions and explore whether this effect
varies by the level of firm risk.
The findings of our study suggest that a diversified syndicate structure plays a signifi-
cant role in improving the loan terms for borrowers, especially riskier firms.3 In line with
the monitoring benefits argument, we find that a diversified syndicate structure is associ-
ated with lower lending spreads to firms with higher risk as compared to loans provided
by non-diversified syndicates. A one standard deviation increase in firm risk (equivalent
to a 3.3 notches deterioration in credit ratings) is associated with a lower spread of 16.7
1Syndicated loans are typically larger in size than other loans and with longer maturities, hence incur
more monitoring costs over the loan life cycle.
2Compared to foreign banks, domestic banks usually possess better information on borrowers in their
country due to their ongoing relationship-based lending (Haselmann & Wachtel, 2011; Mian, 2006).
3In our sample, 64.2 percent of the loans are extended by syndicates consisting of both domestic and
foreign banks and 35.8 percent are from non-diversified syndicates.
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bps for borrowers with a diversified syndicate, compared to syndicates with exclusively
foreign or domestic bank participation. This decrease is about 9.4 percent of the average
loan spread for our sample of syndicated loans.
While we expect the benefits of “soft information” or private information based on
relationship lending (Petersen & Rajan, 1994) to be passed on to all borrowers, this infor-
mation is more important for firms that are under the speculative grade category. Such
loans provided by a diversified syndicate have roughly 35.4 bps lower spreads compared
to non-diversified syndicates. Our findings suggest that the benefit of having a domestic
lender in the syndicate increases as the risk profile of the firm increases. However, for
investment grade borrowers and those in the lower end of the risk spectrum, we find that
a diversified syndicate structure can be more costly than borrowing exclusively from for-
eign banks.4 One possible explanation is that foreign banks in a non-diversified syndicate
tend to cherry-pick borrowers and are comfortable in lending primarily to low-risk firms
(Gormley, 2010). Hence, foreign banks may be able to price their loans competitively
when lending to such borrowers. Whereas, when it comes to riskier borrowers such as
those in the speculative grade category, foreign banks may prefer a diversified syndicate
that also includes domestic banks, which possess more soft information about such firms.
The finding on the benefits offered by a diversified syndicate structure for high-risk
borrowers is consistent with the theoretical argument that higher monitoring is required
for less creditworthy customers (Diamond, 1991). The credit rating of the firm issued
by various credit rating agencies is an observable measure of firm risk that signals the
borrower’s type (good or bad borrower). Credit rating agencies act as passive monitors
that help lenders reduce the information asymmetry in lending decisions (Tirole, 2010).
The key role of credit ratings is to reduce the “fog of asymmetric information” by way
of opinions on the credit risk of firms (White, 2010). Information asymmetries and
monitoring costs tend to be higher when lending to speculative grade borrowers, due to
a higher degree of adverse selection and moral hazard problems (Berndt & Gupta, 2009).
Further, we examine whether a diversified syndicate is more important during periods
4Among the non-diversified syndicates in our sample, the proportion of syndicates with exclusively
foreign banks is 90 percent.
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of heightened economic policy uncertainty. Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016) find that the
investments, employment, and outputs are adversely affected during these periods. Infor-
mation asymmetries are likely to be higher during periods of greater policy uncertainty
(Nagar, Schoenfeld, & Wellman, 2019; Pastor & Veronesi, 2012). Consistent with the
argument on information asymmetry, we find that the moderating effect of a diversified
syndicate on loan spreads is more pronounced during such uncertain times. The findings
suggest that a diversified syndicate, with participation of domestic banks, acts as an
important source of soft information during times of higher information asymmetries.
We conduct several robustness tests to validate our main findings. Our results are
robust when we compare opaque (non-rated) and transparent (rated) firms, instead of
a continuous measure of risk. We find that opaque firms benefit more in terms of loan
spreads from a diversified syndicate structure compared to transparent firms. Further,
our main results are consistent for restricted samples that include only domestic currency
loans, only U.S. dollar loans, and exclusion of financial crisis years, and are also robust
to the inclusion of lead bank controls. We find that the moderating effect of a diversi-
fied syndicate is higher for domestic currency loans compared to foreign currency loans,
possibly due to a better ex-ante risk profile of firms that take foreign currency loans.
In addition to these robustness tests, we account for potential endogeneity concerns
that could arise out of selection bias. In our baseline panel data estimates, we include a
range of firm, bank, and country-specific controls, along with firm fixed effects to account
for heterogeneity among firms and year fixed effects for time-varying common factors.
However, it is still possible that our observed sample of rated syndicated loans may be
subject to self-selection. We identify two possible forms of selection bias: the choice of
firms to get rated, and the choice to access syndicated loan markets for raising capital.
In order to control for such possible biases, we employ a two-step estimator proposed by
Heckman (1979). When we control for the potential selection bias in the choice of firms
to get rated, the findings are consistent with the baseline results. We do not find selection
bias to be a major concern when we control for the choice to obtain a syndicated loan.
Nevertheless, the effects of a diversified syndicate structure on the loan spreads after
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controlling for such selection are similar in sign and significance to our baseline findings.
Our choice of non-U.S. countries is motivated by two reasons. First, it has been found
that information asymmetry in the U.S. credit markets is significantly lower than other
countries (Bailey, Karolyi, & Salva, 2006; Leuz, Verrecchia, et al., 2000). Hence, the
choice of non-U.S. firms provides an opportunity to analyze the effects of diversification
of loan syndicates in markets where information asymmetries may be higher. Second, em-
pirical literature has extensively researched syndicated lending for U.S. firms (Ivashina,
2009; Ivashina & Scharfstein, 2010; Sufi, 2007), although there are some cross-country
studies that also include the United States (Giannetti & Yafeh, 2012). Complement-
ing earlier studies on syndicated lending in other regions, such as transition countries
in Europe (Haselmann & Wachtel, 2011) and emerging markets in Latin America and
Eastern Europe (Nini, 2004), we contribute to this literature by focusing on a broader
sample of non-U.S. firms across 31 countries. We re-estimate our baseline regression with
the inclusion of U.S. firms and find that the results are similar to that documented for
the non-U.S. sample. However, the moderating effect of a diversified syndicate structure
is smaller for the sample that includes U.S. firms, which is consistent with the lower
information asymmetries documented for the U.S loan markets.
The benefits of a diversified syndicate are related to the literature on information
asymmetries faced by foreign banks in lending to borrowers in other countries. Mian
(2006) finds that greater physical and cultural distance between a foreign bank’s head-
quarters and local branches leads to the bank avoiding making loans to firms that require
relational contracting, and also to lower recoveries, given a reduced ability to renegotiate
contracts bilaterally.5 Detragiache, Tressel, and Gupta (2008) show that cherry-picking
by foreign banks leads to a reduction in welfare and efficiency of the overall banking sys-
tem, as borrowers with better information no longer pool with riskier borrowers, leading
to higher cost of borrowing for the latter set of firms. Giannetti and Ongena (2012)
find that while foreign banks are likely to maintain a relationship with large firms and
5Sufi (2007) finds that participant lenders in a syndicate choose to be more proximate to borrowers
when information asymmetry is more severe. Giannetti and Yafeh (2012) show that higher cultural
distance between the lead bank and borrower can adversely affect loan contracting terms.
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firms with foreign ownership, overall credit access for firms improves with the presence
of foreign banks. Using loan-level information in the UK, Bosch and Steffen (2011) show
that foreign banks stay away from lending to unrated firms.
The potential role of a diversified syndicate structure in reducing monitoring and in-
formation costs in loan syndicates is also closely related to the literature on delegated
monitoring and cross-monitoring. Earlier studies in finance have found that delegating
monitoring lowers debt contracting costs (Diamond, 1984; Fama, 1990). Cross-monitoring
may be observed in the presence of multiple types of lenders when one type benefits in the
form of lower monitoring costs from the observable monitoring of the other type (Booth,
1992; Datta, Iskandar-Datta, & Patel, 1999). The authors find that cross-monitoring
helps in reducing the spreads of the bond issues because the bondholders benefit from
the cross-monitoring of the banks. Similarly, Rauh and Sufi (2010) find that bondholders
prefer to have a cross-default provision for speculative grade firms as they prefer to pre-
serve value by depending on the higher monitoring undertaken by banks. The literature
on foreign bank lending has largely ignored the role of a diversified syndicate structure
involving domestic banks in syndicated loan markets.
This paper contributes to the literature on monitoring and information costs in bank
lending in four ways. First, we provide evidence on diversified syndicate structure in help-
ing banks address the insufficient availability of ‘soft information’ when lending in other
countries. Our findings contribute to the literature on soft information and monitoring
costs in relationship lending by banks (Berndt & Gupta, 2009; Detragiache et al., 2008;
Diamond, 1991; Petersen & Rajan, 1994). Second, we are able to disentangle the benefits
of a diversified syndicate structure across the distribution of firms’ credit risk. Our choice
of firm credit rating provides a much closer identification of firm risk compared to earlier
studies by Haselmann and Wachtel (2011) on foreign bank participation in loan syndi-
cates, wherein the authors classify large (small) markets as less (more) risky; and Nini
(2004), who uses more aggregate measures of risk when considering borrowing costs with
local lender participation. Our study reconciles earlier findings on foreign bank lending
by considering the benefits of a diversified syndicate structure that vary with firm ratings.
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At the lower end of the firm risk distribution, our findings support the argument in favor
of foreign bank efficiency over monitoring benefits, whereas, in the higher end of the risk
spectrum, the role of monitoring assumes a larger role.
Third, our findings on the structure of syndicates involving foreign and domestic
banks complement the literature on the distance of the lender to the borrower (Giannetti
& Yafeh, 2012; Mian, 2006; Sufi, 2007) by understanding the effect of a diversified syndi-
cate structure through which the higher proximity of participant lenders affects the loan
contract terms. Finally, our findings on the increased benefits of a diversified syndicate
structure during higher economic policy uncertainty contribute to the literature on policy
uncertainty and information asymmetries (Nagar et al., 2019; Pastor & Veronesi, 2012).
In the next section, we explain the data, sample selection, and empirical methodology
used in the study. In the subsequent section, we present the results and discuss the
key findings. Further, we perform several robustness tests to validate our key findings.
Finally, we conclude the paper with a discussion on the relevance of the main findings
and the contribution of this study to the literature on syndicated loan markets.
2 Data and methodology
2.1 Data
We obtain data on syndicated loans from the Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC) Dealscan
database of Thomson Reuters. This is a widely used database that has a comprehensive
coverage of syndicated deals across a large number of countries. For instance, Qian and
Strahan (2007) use the Dealscan database to show that stronger creditor rights lead
to longer maturities and lower interest rates of syndicated loans. Our sample covers
information on all syndicated bank loans across 31 countries. We include non-financial
corporations and exclude those syndicated loans by firms categorized under Banks, Non-
Bank Financials, and Government. As we are interested in the role of monitoring for
varying degree of credit risk, we focus on syndicated loans where credit rating information
is available. We include deals that have information on issuer credit ratings from Standard
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& Poor’s, Moody’s or Fitch. The letter ratings are converted to an ordinal variable which
takes a value between 1 and 22, where 1 refers to an AAA-rated firm and 22 refers to
a D-rated firm. The average numeric value of this ordinal variable across all the three
rating agencies (Borr risk), with higher values indicating higher firm risk, is used in the
analysis.
The key dependent variable that we use to capture the effects of better screening and
monitoring by banks is the weighted average spread of the loans. The spread information
is taken from the all in drawn spread, which includes all the fees, commitments and
the interest rate over the benchmark rate. In order to ensure consistency in the spread
information, we include only deals with the LIBOR as a benchmark rate. Loan spreads
are likely to be sensitive to the additional monitoring costs incurred by banks to mitigate
asymmetric information (Coleman, Esho, & Sharpe, 2006), which can vary by firm risk.
Annual borrower-level information on loans, such as the spread, credit rating and maturity
of the loan is obtained as a weighted average, with respective tranche amounts used as
weights. We aggregate the loans taken by each firm by cumulating the tranche level loan
amounts (in millions of U.S. dollar) at an annual frequency.
The classification of syndicated loans into loans borrowed from diversified syndicates
(with both domestic and foreign bank lenders) and those from non-diversified syndicates
(with either exclusively foreign banks or domestic banks) is based on the variable Lender
operating country in the LPC database. The Div syn dummy variable takes the value
1 for loans with syndicates that have a mix of domestic and foreign banks among the
participant lenders and 0 for non-diversified syndicates. The construction of this variable
is based on studies that explore the role of foreign bank lending (Giannetti & Laeven,
2012; Haselmann & Wachtel, 2011). The kernel density plot of loan spreads for both
diversified and non-diversified syndicates is shown in Figure 1. The figure suggests that
the distribution of the spreads for loans by non-diversified syndicates is skewed to the
right compared to diversified syndicates. In the econometric analysis, we explore whether
this difference in spreads holds after controlling for a range of other factors.
The baseline estimations include a variety of loan-level and country-level controls.
8
Loan-level variables include the logarithm of loan amount and loan maturity, number
of participant lenders, and loan-level dummies for the presence of collateral and loan
covenants. The loan-level controls are incorporated in earlier studies on loan syndications
(Giannetti & Yafeh, 2012; Sufi, 2007). A larger number of lenders in the syndicate can
help in reducing the risk of lending in countries with poor legal rights (Ongena & Smith,
2000; Qian & Strahan, 2007). Country-specific variables employed as controls in our study
include the GDP growth and per capita GDP obtained from the World Development
Indicators of the World Bank. The final sample consists of 1,972 observations for 796
firms in 31 non-U.S. countries and spans a 24 year period between 1994 and 2017. The
list of countries in our study is shown in Table A1.
The descriptive statistics of the key variables used in the study are detailed in Ta-
ble 2 based on the baseline sample observations. The average firm in our sample has
a weighted spread of 176.96 bps over the benchmark LIBOR interest rate. The aver-
age loan amount in the sample is 765 million U.S. dollars and loan tenor is 45 months.
On an average, 27% of the deals were secured by collateral and 14% had some form of
covenants. The median loan has a firm risk rating (Borr risk) of 10.0 corresponding to
the investment grade category (BBB- or better). On an average, 45% of the firms in the
sample were in the speculative grade category. Among all the syndicated loan deals, 64%
were financed by banks in a diversified syndicate. Syndicates with exclusively foreign
banks (Excl For bank) account for 32% of the observations while exclusively domestic
banks (Excl Dombank) account for the remaining 3%. The description of the variables
and the source of data are provided in Table 1. The pairwise correlations of the variables
employed in this study are shown in Table A2.
2.2 Methodology
In order to test our hypothesis that the effect of a diversified syndicate structure on
borrowing costs depends on firms’ risk, we employ the following empirical strategy. The
dependent variable employed in the analysis is the weighted average loan spread above
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the LIBOR benchmark interest rate. The regression equation is as follows:
Loan Spread ijt = α0 + α1Div syn ijt + α2Div syn ijt × Borr riskijt + α3Borr riskijt
+
∑
m
Xijm,t × α4m +
∑
n
Yjn,t−1 × α5n + µi + τt + ǫijt
(1)
where, Loan Spreadijt is the weighted average spread for all the loans availed by the
firm i in country j in the year t. Div syn takes the value of 1 if the syndicate includes
both foreign and domestic banks, and 0 for non-diversified syndicates. Borr risk refers
to the credit risk of a firm, where higher values of the ordinal variable refer to higher
credit risk, as discussed in the previous section. The explanatory variable of interest is
the interaction between Borr risk ×Div syn. A negative sign of this interaction term
would reflect the extent to which a diversified syndicate structure reduces the foreign
banks’ monitoring cost for riskier firms and, in turn, lowers the loan spreads for such
firms.
X is a vector of loan-level controls that includes the logarithm of the loan amount,
logarithm of the weighted average maturity of the loans, and dummies that capture the
presence of collateral and the presence of covenants. Y is a vector of country-specific
variables that includes GDP growth, a proxy for the demand for credit and investment,
and the GDP per capita, a proxy for country-specific borrowing capacity.
We employ a panel data fixed effects model to control for time-invariant firm-specific
effects. The firm fixed effects, which are at a lower level of aggregation, would subsume
all other fixed effects, such as industry and country fixed effects. Additionally, we include
year dummies in the regressions to capture any time-specific systemic shocks to loan
spreads, such as the global financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. Further,
standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm-level. In
alternative estimations, we also control for lead bank and firm characteristics. In order
to test our main effect during heightened economic policy uncertainty, we re-estimate
the baseline specification of Equation 1 for periods with high and low economic policy
uncertainty.
10
3 Results
3.1 Monitoring benefits of diversified syndicate structure
We estimate Equation 1 to examine the role of a diversified syndicate structure in reducing
monitoring costs. Columns (1)-(4) of Table 3 show the estimation results of Equation 1
with the inclusion of an interaction term for Borr risk×Div syn. The results in column
(1) include the interaction term, along with level terms for the firm rating (Borr risk),
syndicate structure (Div syn) and firm fixed effects. In column (2), we add year effects to
take into account time-varying common shocks. In column (3), we add loan-level controls,
for loan-specific features, such as size, maturity, collateral, the presence of covenants, and
the number of lenders in the syndicate. Column (4) also includes controls for country-
specific factors that include GDP growth and Log GDPPC.
The negative coefficient of the interaction for Borr risk×Div syn in all four columns
of Table 3 suggests that higher the riskiness of the firm, the lower the spreads on the loans
obtained from a diversified syndicate consisting of both domestic and foreign banks com-
pared to non-diversified syndicates. In column (1), which excludes loan-level or country-
level controls, a one notch increase in Borr risk (with higher values representing worse
ratings) is associated with a lower spread of about 6.36 bps for a one notch increase in
credit risk for firms borrowing from a diversified syndicate. With the inclusion of loan-
specific controls and country-specific controls in columns (3) and (4), the reduction in
the loan spread for a one notch increase in firm risk is about 5.18 bps and 5.05 bps,
respectively. The results for column (4) imply that a one standard deviation increase in
the credit risk of the firm (equivalent to a 3.3 notches deterioration in the credit rating)
is associated with a reduced spread of about 16.7 bps for a diversified syndicate, as com-
pared to a non-diversified syndicate. This reduction is about 9.4 percent of the average
loan spread for our sample of syndicated loans.
The level term of Div syn is positive in all the columns. Given the interaction term,
the level term can be interpreted as the spread incurred by diversified syndicates when
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Borr risk is zero. In order to better understand this result, we plot the predicted spreads
based on the regression results in column (4) by Borr risk (see Figure 2). The predicted
spreads suggest that at the lower end of the Borr risk category, the spreads are lower
for non-diversified syndicates, which are dominated by foreign bank syndicates. As the
Borr risk increases, the relationship reverses (at around value 8 for Borr risk, corre-
sponding to a credit rating of BBB+), and the spreads of loans from diversified syndicates
become lower as compared to the non-diversified syndicates. The reversal in the relation-
ship provides evidence in favor of the argument that the efficiency and service quality
benefits of foreign bank lending (in a non-diversified syndicate) are more relevant for
lower-risk borrowers (Bonin et al., 2005; Claessens et al., 2001), whereas, the benefits of
“soft information” and monitoring provided by domestic banks (in a diversified syndicate)
are relevant for higher risk borrowers (Park, 2000; Petersen & Rajan, 1994).
Among the significant control variables, we find that the coefficient of GDP growth
is negative, implying that higher GDP growth is associated with lower loan spreads. This
result may be due to the increased willingness of banks to extend loans to borrowers in
faster-growing economies. The sign of Collateral dum is positive, which is suggestive
of higher premiums on loans charged to borrowers that require collateral, even after
accounting for the observable measure of credit risk, consistent with Giannetti and Yafeh
(2012). The other control variables are not statistically significant, although the negative
signs for amount and the number of lenders and a positive sign for loan maturity are
in the expected direction and consistent with prior studies on syndicated loan spreads
(Giannetti & Yafeh, 2012; Ivashina, 2009).
The results that are shown in Table 3 suggest that a diversified syndicate structure
has a negative impact on the loan spreads of riskier firms, on average. The inclusion of
domestic banks in the syndicate is likely to mitigate some of the risks for foreign banks
when lending to worse-rated firms that require greater monitoring efforts. Domestic
banks are more likely to have better information on firms in the home country, given
their physical proximity to the firms. Besides, they are more likely to provide efficiency
in future loan renegotiation or recoveries (Mian, 2006; Park, 2000).
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3.2 Extensions of the baseline estimations
The results reported so far are based on a continuous measure of firms’ credit ratings.
To account for the possibility that there may be systematic differences in the risk profile
between firms rated investment grade (BBB- or better rating) and those rated speculative
grade (BB+ or worse rating), we test the baseline results for Equation 1 and all the above
extensions to the baseline with a binary indicator for speculative grade rating instead of
the continuous rating measure. Riskier firms that require higher monitoring are proxied
by Sub Inv which takes the value of 1 if the firm belongs to the speculative grade rating
category and 0 otherwise.
The coefficient of the Sub Inv×Div syn indicator in column (1) of Table 4 suggests
that after controlling for the higher level of spreads charged to speculative grade firms
based on their risk profile, diversified syndicates with a mix of domestic and foreign
banks reduce the spreads on such loans by about 38 bps compared to non-diversified
syndicates. Diversified syndicates are able to most reduce the wedge in borrowing costs
between speculative grade and investment grade firms. The results for the interaction
of the high-risk indicators Sub Inv and Div syn are consistent with the baseline results
reported in Table 3.
Earlier studies on syndicated loan markets have considered unrated or opaque firms as
associated with greater information asymmetry and require more monitoring (Giannetti &
Yafeh, 2012; Ivashina, 2009; Sufi, 2007). In the estimation shown in column (2) of Table 4,
we compare the impact of a diversified syndicate structure on the loan spreads for opaque
firms and the rated firms. A firm could choose to not get rated and yet obtain syndicated
loan facilities based on the private information of the lenders, for e.g. past relationship
in other facilities. These studies also argue that such firms tend to be riskier compared
to the rated firms. While we do not find any evidence of a difference in the spreads
between these two cohorts (see the coefficient of the level term Opaque), we find that the
interaction term (see Opaque×Div syn) is negative and significant. Consistent with our
hypothesis of a diversified syndicate structure in reducing information asymmetries, the
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impact is larger for opaque firms.
Next, we re-estimate the baseline model with additional controls for lead bank and
firm characteristics. We obtain the names of the lead banks of each syndicated loan deal
from the LPC database. We obtain the data on the lead arranger banks from Moody’s
Analytics Bank Focus database. Since the LPC database provides only the names of the
lenders, we employ two matching strategies to obtain the lead bank information. First,
we obtain the unique id (ISIN ) of those lead banks that also have borrowing information
in the LPC database, i.e. if these banks have obtained wholesale funding from other
banks. Second, we do a string match with the names of banks in LPC and OBF. We are
able to match roughly 65% of all lead bank names with the OBF database. In about half
of the syndicated loans that involve only a single lead bank, the bank control variables
obtained from the OBF database are matched with the LPC data. For the remaining half
of the loans with more than one lead bank, we compute the simple average of the lead-
arranger control variables obtained from the OBF database.6 The lead bank variables in
the robustness regressions include equity to assets ratio (a measure of capital adequacy),
net interest margin (an indicator of profitability), and logarithm of total assets (a proxy
for bank size).
The results of the estimation shown in column (3) of Table 4 for the Div syn are
largely consistent with the findings of the baseline estimations. In column (4) of Table 4,
we re-estimate Equation 1 with firm-level controls, such as market to book ratio, tangi-
bility, asset size, and profitability. The data on syndicated loans in the LPC database is
matched to the firm-level information in the Worldscope database using the unique bor-
rower International Securities Identification Number (ISIN ). The Worldscope database
has been used in earlier cross-country studies involving firm-level financial information.
We are able to match about 50% of the observations in the DealScan database with the
Worldscope database. The results suggest that the sensitivity of loan spreads to a diver-
sified syndicate structure is moderated to a larger extent with a reduction of 11.5 bps as
6The simple average of lead bank controls is taken since information on the proportional exposure of
each of the lead banks is generally unavailable for loans that involve more than one lead arranger in the
non-U.S. sample.
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compared to 5.1 bps for the full sample. Further, in column (5), we control for both lead
bank as well as firm-level controls. With the full set of controls including firm-specific and
lead-bank specific controls, the impact of a diversified syndicate structure on loan spreads
is a decline of 13.14 bps for a one notch increase in Borr risk. The results suggest a
significantly higher moderating effect as compared to the baseline results.
3.3 Effect of economic policy uncertainty
In this section, we ask whether the benefits obtained from having a diversified syndicate
structure is more pronounced during period of heightened economic policy uncertainty.
We estimate Equation 1 for various subsamples of firms under high and low economic
policy uncertainty at the country level. There is an increasing interest in the economic
policy uncertainty (EPU) index of Baker et al. (2016). The index, developed based on
the text analysis of leading newspaper articles, provides a measure of uncertainty at the
country level. We classify the observations into two groups, high-EPU and low-EPU
based on whether EPU is above or below the sample median.
The results of the estimations are shown in Table 5 columns (4) to (6). We replicate
the results observed for the baseline sample with the sample with EPU information in
column (4). The results are consistent with the baseline results. The coefficient of
the interaction term Borr risk × Div syn is negative and significant in the case of the
sub-group with high EPU (see column (5)). The coefficient is lower in magnitude and
statistically insignificant for the low EPU subsample. The findings suggest that the
impact of a diversified syndicate structure is more pronounced during periods of higher
policy uncertainty, which are likely to be associated with higher information asymmetry
in financial markets (Nagar et al., 2019; Pastor & Veronesi, 2012). Our results support
the view that the monitoring benefits of a diversified syndicate are likely to be pertinent
during such episodes of greater policy uncertainty.
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4 Robustness of the results
We do several additional estimations to ensure the robustness of our results. First, we
exclude the global financial crisis years 2008 and 2009 from the estimations. Second,
we re-estimate the baseline regression for only domestic currency loans, and third, for
only U.S. dollar loans. Fourth, we exclude syndicated loans obtained exclusively from
domestic banks. Fifth, we re-estimate the model with the inclusion of firms incorporated
in the United States. Finally, we control for potential endogeneity arising out of selection
bias. We control for two separate selection issues, first, for the choice of the firm to get
rated, and second for the choice of the firm to access the syndicated loan market in any
given year.
4.1 Excluding crisis years
Several studies document that the global financial crisis of 2008-09 coincided with a
significant disruption in the syndicated loan markets (Giannetti & Laeven, 2012) and in-
creased information asymmetry in bank lending (Ivashina & Scharfstein, 2010; Kleimeier
& Chaudhry, 2015). Hence, in this estimation, we restrict our sample of firm-year ob-
servations to only the non-financial crisis years. The estimation shown in column (1) of
Table 6 suggests that the impact of a diversified syndicate structure after excluding the
crisis years is consistent with the baseline findings for the full sample. The moderating
effect of a diversified syndicate structure is 4.4 bps for a one unit increase in firm risk
for the non-crisis sample, slightly lower than the 5.1 bps observed for the baseline. The
lower magnitude of the effect may be explained by the exclusion of the crisis years that
are associated with greater information asymmetry in the financial markets.
4.2 Domestic currency loans
In this section, we limit our analysis to loans obtained in domestic currency. It is possible
that the information asymmetry faced by the foreign banks would be higher in case
of domestic currency loans, given the exposure to currency risk. Hence, we estimate
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Equation 1 in column (2) with only domestic currency loans. As expected, the results
suggest that the impact of a diversified syndicate structure is more pronounced for such
loans. A one unit increase in firm risk is associated with an 8.7 bps reduction in spread for
those loans with a diversified syndicate structure compared to non-diversified syndicates.
As expected, the higher moderating effect compared to the baseline results substantiates
the argument that domestic currency loans tend to be associated with higher levels of
information asymmetry for participant foreign banks in syndicated loans.
4.3 U.S. dollar loans
We have considered loans in the major currencies in the baseline sample. However, the
currency denomination of the syndicated loan might influence the loan spreads due to
risk of cross-currency movements. Hence, to test the robustness of our findings, in this
section, we limit our sample to only U.S. dollar loans. About 74% of our sample of hard-
currency loans consists of U.S. dollar loans. The results of the estimations are shown in
Table 6 column (3). The sensitivity of loan spreads to borrower risk is marginally lower
for loans in U.S. dollars as compared to the full sample that includes loans in other hard
currencies as well. This suggests that our baseline findings are robust to the choice of
currencies.
4.4 Excluding syndicates with only domestic banks
In this estimation, we exclude the loans with only domestic banks in the syndicate,
which constitute about 3.4% of our baseline sample. The exclusion would permit us to
compare the diversified and non-diversified syndicates with at least one foreign bank.
The results presented in column (4) of Table 6 test the validity of our baseline results
after excluding the loans with exclusively domestic bank participation. The result for
Borr risk×Div syn is of similar sign and significance as observed for the baseline results.
The magnitude of the sensitivity is marginally higher for the restricted sample compared
to the full sample.
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4.5 Inclusion of firms in the United States
Next, we re-estimate Equation 1 for an extended sample that contains firms that are
incorporated in the United States and the 31 non-U.S. countries in the baseline sample.
The findings are shown in Table 6. The result in column (5) indicates that the baseline
finding that domestic bank presence reduces lending spreads to high-risk borrowers is
consistent with the extended sample of firms. However, the magnitude of the benefits
drawn by riskier firms is lower in this sample. One potential explanation for the re-
duction in the effect of a diversified syndicate structure is that the robust institutional
framework has significantly reduced the information asymmetry in the United States. As
a consequence, the role of domestic banks in a diversified syndicate structure would be
limited. This result also suggests that the findings are not driven by our choice of sample
of countries. The results, including firms in the United States, are consistent with our
overall findings.
4.6 Controlling for selection bias in ratings
One of the limitations in our analysis is the availability of credit ratings for firms in the
DealScan database. Some firms choose to remain opaque by obtaining loans from the
syndicated loan markets without getting rated by an independent credit rating agency.
While we can only speculate regarding the creditworthiness of such firms at this stage,
we can control for the choice of firms to get rated and become more transparent. In this
section, we address this concern.
We employ a Heckman two-stage selection model to address the concerns of endo-
geneity arising out of selection bias. The first stage estimation shown in Table 7 column
(1) is a Probit selection equation where the dependent variable takes the value 1 if the
firm is rated and 0 if the firm is opaque. The results of the first stage estimation suggest
that larger firms with higher profitability, larger size, and higher growth opportunities
have a higher propensity to get rated. Firms with lower leverage are also more likely to
get rated. The results of the second stage estimations in column (2) without firm-level
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controls, and column (3) with firm-level controls suggest that after controlling for the
potential selection bias, the impact of domestic bank presence in the syndicate, along
with foreign banks reduce the loan spreads of the borrowers.
4.7 Controlling for selection bias in accessing syndicated loans
In this section, we address the possibility that syndicated loan issuance may depend on
firm characteristics, which could potentially bias the baseline results reported in Table 8.
Relatively smaller firms are known to depend more on bank financing relative to other
sources of formal debt financing (Denis & Mihov, 2003). Larger firms may have easier
access to syndicated loans than other firms if such lending involves high transaction costs.
More profitable firms have better access to internal cash flows and may have lower demand
for external financing. Firms with higher growth opportunities, proxied by the market to
book ratio, may have greater investment needs and higher demand for loans financing.
Leverage is a measure of the debt overhang of the firm. These firm-level controls have
been employed in earlier studies on the determinants of the capital structure decision of
firms (Berger, Ofek, & Yermack, 1997; Myers, 1977).
We use a Heckman selection model to address the potential selectivity in the decision
to obtain syndicated loans by firms. The first stage estimation involves a Probit regression
of the loan issuance decision on firm-level characteristics. The firm-level data on logarithm
of assets, tangibility, market-to-book ratio, EBITDA to assets, and book value of debt
to equity (leverage) are obtained from the Thomson Reuters Worldscope database. The
selection (first-stage) sample includes information on firms that accessed and those that
did not access syndicated loan markets between 1996 and 2017.
The first stage selection results presented in column (1) of Table 8 suggest that prof-
itability and higher tangibility of assets are positively related to the decision to obtain a
syndicated loan, while firm size is negatively related to the decision. The second-stage
results are shown in column (2) of Table 8, without firm controls, and column (3), with
firm controls. The insignificant coefficient of the Inverse Mills ratio suggests that po-
tential selection bias arising out of the choice to obtain a syndicated loan is not a major
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concern when we consider the effect of syndicate structure on loan spreads. However, the
coefficients of Borr risk × Div syn are consistent in terms of the sign and significance
with the baseline results on the role of a diversified syndicate structure, shown in Table 3.
5 Conclusion
In this study, we examine whether the effect of syndicate structure on borrowing costs
varies with firm risk. A diversified syndicate structure that includes both domestic and
foreign banks can help in mitigating potential ex-post moral hazard costs by improving
monitoring, facilitating re-negotiations during recovery, and providing private information
about riskier borrowers. We assess the relative benefits of a diversified syndicate structure
on loan spreads across 31 countries other than the United States.
We find that syndicated loan deals that involve a diversified syndicate structure are
associated with lower spreads than those with non-diversified syndicates, particularly for
high-risk borrowers who require greater monitoring. However, for low-risk borrowers, we
find that non-diversified syndicates consisting of foreign banks are able to offer better
loan terms. This finding suggests that the efficiency of exclusive foreign bank lending
may be more important than the monitoring benefits of a diversified syndicate for such
borrowers. We also find that the benefits of a diversified syndicate structure are accentu-
ated during periods of higher economic policy uncertainty, which tends to coincide with
higher asymmetric information in the financial markets. Our baseline findings hold af-
ter controlling for loan-specific factors and country-specific variables, and are robust to
alternative specifications, subsamples, and controls for potential selection bias.
Syndicated bank lending provides access to alternative sources of financing and can
offer important benefits for non-financial corporations in the form of larger amounts and
longer tenor. Participating in diversified loan syndicates with domestic banks allows
foreign banks to benefit from the relationship that domestic banks enjoy with local bor-
rowers. In such cases, the lower monitoring and screening costs are passed on to the
borrower in the form of better loan terms.
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Figure 1: Spread distribution by syndicate structure
The figure depicts the difference in the kernel density distribution of the loan spreads with both
domestic and foreign banks in the syndicate and non-diversified syndicates.
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Figure 2: Predicted spreads - multivariate specification
The figure depicts the difference in the predicted spreads of the syndicated loans obtained from
diversified syndicate and non-diversified syndicates.
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Table 1: Variables description and source
Variables Definition and construction Source
Loan Spread (bps) The weighted average spread (with loan
amount as weights) of all loans taken by a firm
in a year (Allindrawnspread)
Loan Pricing
Corporation
Dealscan
Div syn Dummy variable take the value 1 if the loan
syndicate consists of a mix of domestic and
foreign banks and 0 for non-diversified syndi-
cates. A bank is classified as a foreign bank if
the lender operating country is different from
the country of domicile of the firm. A bank is
classified as a domestic bank if the country of
domicile and lender operating country is same.
Loan Pricing
Corporation
Dealscan
Log amount The logarithm of the aggregate loans (sum of
all loans in millions of U.S. dollar) obtained by
a firm in a year
Loan Pricing
Corporation
Dealscan
Log maturity The logarithm of the weighted average matu-
rity (with loan amount as weights) of all loans
taken during a year by a firm
Loan Pricing
Corporation
Dealscan
Borr risk The weighted average ratings (with loan
amount as weights) for all loans taken by a
firm in a year. The rating for each loan is the
average of the Long-term Issuer ratings pro-
vided by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch. We use an
ordinal rating scale, where 1 refers to AAA-
rating and 22 refers to D-rating.
Loan Pricing
Corporation
Dealscan
Collateral dum Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the
deal is secured by any collateral and 0 other-
wise
Loan Pricing
Corporation
Dealscan
Covenant dum Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the
deal has any covenants and 0 otherwise
Loan Pricing
Corporation
Dealscan
Excl Dom bank Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if its is
a non-diversified syndicates with only domes-
tic banks and 0 otherwise. A bank is classified
as a domestic bank if the country of domicile
and lender operating country is same.
Loan Pricing
Corporation
Dealscan
GDP growth The annual GDP growth rate of the country
of domicile of the firm
World Develop-
ment Indicators
(World Bank)
Log GDPPC Natural logarithm of the per capita GDP of a
country in a year
Bloomberg
Continued on next page
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Table 1 – Continued from previous page
Variables Definition and Construction Source
Leadbank EqtoAsset The ratio of book value of equity to the assets
of the lead banks, averaged over all the lead
banks. We take only a simple average of the
ratios of each lead bank since the participation
rates of each lead bank is not available for most
of the deals.
Moody’s An-
alytics Bank
Focus
Leadbank NIM The net interest margin of the lead banks, av-
eraged over all the lead banks.
Moody’s An-
alytics Bank
Focus
Leadbank Lnasset Natural logarithm of the total assets of the
lead banks in million U.S. dollar, averaged over
all the lead banks.
Moody’s An-
alytics Bank
Focus
No.Lenders The total number of lenders in the loan syndi-
cate.
Loan Pricing
Corporation
Dealscan
Log asset Natural logarithm of the total assets of the
firm denominated in 1000 U.S. dollars.
Worldscope
Tangibility The proportion of net fixed assets scaled by
the total assets of a firm.
EBIDTA asset Ratio of the total operating income of the firm
in a year scaled by the total assets.
Worldscope
M/B Ratio of the market value of equity to the book
value of equity of the firm.
Worldscope
Leverage Ratio of the total debt to equity of the firm. Worldscope
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev Median Min Max P10 P90
Loan variables
Spread 1,972 176.96 149.56 140.00 3.00 1415.00 33.00 375.00
Collateral dum 1,972 0.27 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Covenant dum 1,972 0.14 0.35 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Log amount 1,972 6.64 1.30 6.62 1.58 10.92 5.01 8.29
Log maturity 1,972 3.81 0.56 3.99 1.10 6.58 2.88 4.37
Syndicate structure
Lenders 1,972 11.38 9.57 9.00 1.00 94.00 2.00 23.00
Div syn 1,972 0.64 0.48 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Excl Dom bank 1,972 0.03 0.18 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Excl For bank 1,972 0.32 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Lead bank variables
Leadbank Eqtoasst 1,306 7.34 2.01 7.28 2.53 20.80 4.71 10.53
Leadbank NIM 1,307 2.17 0.99 1.94 0.06 6.60 0.89 3.92
Leadbank Lnasset 1,306 13.95 0.70 14.12 9.54 15.06 12.81 14.60
Firm variables
Borr risk 1,972 10.28 3.29 10.00 1.00 22.00 6.00 15.00
Sub inv 1,972 0.45 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Leverage 1,026 1.00 1.76 0.84 0.08 54.29 0.46 1.53
M/B 1,004 2.69 7.77 1.69 0.03 222.09 0.74 4.49
Tangibility 1,024 0.47 0.26 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.09 0.80
EBITDA asset 1,026 0.08 0.07 0.07 -0.29 0.45 0.01 0.16
Log asset 1,026 16.02 1.32 16.08 11.38 19.69 14.33 17.68
Country variables
Log GDPPC 1,972 10.08 1.00 10.50 5.84 11.69 8.59 10.87
GDP growth 1,972 2.96 2.98 2.62 -10.89 25.56 0.50 6.64
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Table 3: Monitoring costs in syndicated lending by foreign banks
The dependent variable in the estimations is the weighted average all in drawn spread for the
borrower in year t. Borr risk is the average rating across the three rating agencies. Issue rating
provided by each agency is treated as an ordinal variable which takes a value between 1 and 22,
where 1 refers to AAA rated firm and 22 refers to D rated firm. Div syn takes the value of 1
if the banks in the syndicate are a mix of domestic and foreign banks and 0 for non-diversified
syndicates. Robust standard errors clustered at firm-level are presented in the brackets. ***,
** and * indicates p-values at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. We control for firm fixed effects and year
effects in all the estimations. Detailed definition of the variables are given in Table 1.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Borr risk 30.975*** 28.045*** 26.971*** 26.130***
(3.921) (3.589) (3.703) (3.422)
Div syn 61.221** 50.247** 54.540*** 52.675***
(23.787) (20.683) (20.783) (20.205)
Borr risk ×Div syn -6.362*** -5.156** -5.184** -5.051**
(2.407) (2.145) (2.124) (2.102)
Collateral dum 25.648*** 24.476***
(8.681) (8.824)
Covenant dum 1.995 2.626
(7.570) (7.519)
Log amount -1.686 -0.768
(3.787) (3.537)
Log maturity 1.921 2.478
(5.769) (5.743)
Lenders -0.197 -0.185
(0.294) (0.300)
GDP growtht−1 -2.356**
(1.075)
Log GDPPCt−1 -21.194
(24.739)
Constant -140.723*** -90.783** -94.465** 113.33
(39.437) (37.500) (46.348) (240.673)
Firm-year obs. 2,005 2,005 1,978 1,972
Firms 804 804 797 796
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Adj R2 0.162 0.362 0.372 0.377
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Table 4: Alternative definitions and additional controls
The dependent variable is the weighted average all in drawn spread for the borrower in year
t. Borr risk is the average rating across the three rating agencies. Issue rating provided by
each agency is treated as an ordinal variable which takes a value between 1 and 22, where 1
refers to AAA rated firm and 22 refers to D rated firm. Div syn takes the value of 1 if the
banks in the syndicate are a mix of domestic and foreign banks and 0 if it is exclusively foreign
banks. Robust standard errors clustered at firm-level are presented in the brackets. ***, ** and
* indicates p-values at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. We control for firm fixed effects and year effects
in the second stage estimations. Detailed definition of the variables are given in Table 1.
Alt. risk Opaque Bank Firm Bank & firm
category firms controls controls controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sub Inv 82.431***
(20.412)
Div syn 15.159** 3.928 59.915** 117.692*** 132.018***
(7.002) (6.964) (26.461) (35.666) (31.050)
Sub Inv ×Div syn -35.411***
(12.900)
Opaque 8.467
(9.594)
Opaque×Div syn -16.225**
(7.583)
Borr risk 25.579*** 35.482*** 30.120***
(4.219) (7.947) (5.139)
Borr risk ×Div syn -5.865** -11.540*** -13.139***
(2.698) (3.700) (3.092)
Collateral dum 39.632*** 30.601*** 15.378 15.896 4.728
(9.886) (4.426) (11.794) (16.474) (18.239)
Covenant dum 3.782 -5.089 -1.769 -15.626 -13.806
(8.106) (4.939) (9.941) (11.813) (15.120)
Log amount -3.904 1.665 4.43 -4.797 3.329
(3.903) (2.095) (3.808) (6.129) (4.468)
Log maturity 0.098 -0.171 1.465 -1.566 11.128
(6.242) (3.285) (7.898) (7.279) (7.678)
Lenders -0.132 -0.492** 0.116 -0.219 -0.169
(0.327) (0.193) (0.318) (0.425) (0.488)
GDP growtht−1 -3.468*** -3.053*** -1.929** -2.97 0.686
(1.123) (0.479) (0.972) (1.955) (1.283)
Log GDPPCt−1 -28.772 -34.699*** 18.869 -32.903 35.619
(25.568) (9.658) (18.365) (36.110) (21.840)
Leadbank EqtoAssett−1 -2.287 -4.151
(2.787) (3.145)
Leadbank Lnassett−1 -10.221 10.583
(10.038) (10.223)
Leadbank NIMt−1 0.535 6.695
(6.091) (7.887)
M/Bt−1 0.234 0.194
(0.225) (0.180)
Tangibilityt−1 28.005 -21.909
(72.853) (30.418)
EBITDA assett−1 -36.421 -171.985***
(98.847) (59.273)
Log assett−1 11.051 -2.684
(9.872) (10.527)
Constant 414.227 475.000*** -170.206 10.243 -437.122
(257.396) (89.299) (255.369) (305.091) (308.000)
Firm-year obs. 1,972 12,040 1,306 1,002 701
Firms 796 7,000 588 410 323
Fixed effects Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year
Adj R2 0.314 0.249 0.364 0.368 0.511
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Table 5: Economic uncertainty and loan spreads
The dependent variable is the weighted average all in drawn spread for the borrower in year
t. Borr risk is the average rating across the three rating agencies. Issue rating provided by
each agency is treated as an ordinal variable which takes a value between 1 and 22, where 1
refers to AAA rated firm and 22 refers to D rated firm. Div syn takes the value of 1 if the
banks in the syndicate are a mix of domestic and foreign banks and 0 if it is exclusively foreign
banks. Robust standard errors clustered at firm-level are presented in the brackets. ***, ** and
* indicates p-values at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. We control for firm fixed effects and year effects
in the second stage estimations. Detailed definition of the variables are given in Table 1.
With baseline specification With firm-level controls
Overall High Low Overall High Low
Borr risk 27.340*** 25.858*** 23.143*** 33.806*** 43.063*** 27.779**
(3.865) (5.482) (5.672) (9.057) (6.836) (13.104)
Div syn 63.135*** 52.194* 41.334 104.989*** 156.053*** 42.409
(22.783) (27.770) (27.576) (39.027) (46.151) (40.895)
Borr risk ×Div syn -5.709** -4.886* -3.908 -9.731** -15.314*** -5.599
(2.315) (2.861) (3.188) (4.084) (4.457) (5.565)
Collateral dum 26.672*** -5.938 55.677*** 18.235 -12.783 41.504
(9.293) (11.637) (14.898) (18.421) (18.874) (40.267)
Covenant dum 2.134 -16.656 4.561 -17.909 -34.830** -19.222
(8.273) (13.096) (12.747) (12.897) (17.158) (30.479)
Log amount -1.355 7.924* -5.607 -4.637 8.698* -12.631
(3.887) (4.040) (4.713) (7.503) (4.440) (8.420)
Log maturity 2.175 0.679 4.698 -0.392 7.147 -3.89
(6.432) (8.205) (9.010) (8.872) (8.263) (14.598)
Lenders -0.248 -0.291 -0.317 -0.33 -0.077 -0.071
(0.329) (0.293) (0.525) (0.511) (0.369) (1.056)
GDP growtht−1 -2.383** -1.196 -5.467** -2.78 1.361 -10.023
(1.093) (1.067) (2.286) (2.233) (1.365) (6.621)
Log GDPPCt−1 -27.984 -32.637 -63.357* -33.722 -91.741** -59.598
(25.833) (35.616) (34.179) (39.044) (43.437) (66.042)
M/Bt−1 0.249 0.07 0.096
(0.187) (0.145) (1.748)
Tangibilityt−1 27.102 -25.989 108.362
(79.435) (41.172) (160.049)
EBITDA assett−1 -25.852 -220.419** 68.047
(105.562) (86.379) (165.227)
Log assett−1 9.732 -0.198 8.361
(10.545) (12.803) (21.937)
Constant 172.498 195.346 532.4 -4.163 606.734 416.591
(257.533) (329.753) (343.961) (337.941) (400.227) (695.401)
Firm-year obs. 1,746 1,099 873 890 572 430
Firms 702 522 460 364 279 228
Fixed effects Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year
Adj R2 0.354 0.385 0.383 0.327 0.52 0.394
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Table 6: Robustness: Alternative samples
The dependent variable is the weighted average all in drawn spread for the borrower in year t. Borr risk is the average rating across the three
rating agencies. Issue rating provided by each agency is treated as an ordinal variable which takes a value between 1 and 22, where 1 refers to AAA
rated firm and 22 refers to D rated firm. Div syn takes the value of 1 if the banks in the syndicate are a mix of domestic and foreign banks and 0
if it is exclusively foreign banks. Robust standard errors clustered at firm-level are presented in the brackets. ***, ** and * indicates p-values at
1%, 5% and 10% levels. We control for firm fixed effects and year effects in the second stage estimations. Detailed definition of the variables are
given in Table 1.
Excluding Domestic U.S. Excl. only dom. Including
GFC years currency loans dollar loans bank syndicates U.S. firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Div syn 45.416** 57.814*** 52.508** 57.162** 19.280***
(21.523) (19.289) (22.721) (22.477) (7.148)
Borr risk 24.973*** 24.245*** 24.534*** 26.447*** 25.655***
(3.879) (2.389) (4.131) (3.501) (1.179)
Borr risk ×Div syn -4.375* -8.711*** -4.565* -5.611** -2.219***
(2.303) (1.665) (2.346) (2.296) (0.706)
Collateral dum 29.125*** 30.497** 22.024** 25.495*** 23.578***
(10.202) (12.306) (10.714) (8.786) (2.913)
Covenant dum 2.907 14.904 -0.400 1.081 -2.888
(7.794) (14.494) (8.986) (7.718) (1.986)
Log amount -3.211 0.375 -0.875 -1.339 7.149***
(3.606) (3.763) (4.308) (3.670) (1.285)
Log maturity -0.114 -9.504 3.658 1.183 2.767
(6.093) (6.343) (7.216) (5.779) (1.771)
Lenders -0.134 -1.817*** -0.268 -0.198 -0.846***
(0.298) (0.631) (0.325) (0.305) (0.115)
GDP growtht−1 -2.498** -1.758 -2.524** -2.330** -3.285***
(1.109) (5.257) (1.114) (1.074) (1.106)
Log GDPPCt−1 -26.364 130.848*** -32.49 -22.063 -13.594
(27.198) (38.418) (26.011) (25.014) (22.103)
Constant 194.467 -1335.033*** 232.538 128.173 -5.282
(259.781) (377.323) (253.682) (242.096) (225.114)
Firm-year obs. 1,819 485 1,454 1,903 16,081
Firms 758 256 603 768 4255
Fixed effects Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year
Adj R2 0.324 0.644 0.343 0.377 0.413
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Table 7: Controlling for selection bias in rating
The dependent variable is the weighted average all in drawn spread for the borrower in year
t. Borr risk is the average rating across the three rating agencies. Issue rating provided by
each agency is treated as an ordinal variable which takes a value between 1 and 22, where 1
refers to AAA rated firm and 22 refers to D rated firm. Div syn takes the value of 1 if the
banks in the syndicate are a mix of domestic and foreign banks and 0 if it is exclusively foreign
banks. Robust standard errors clustered at firm-level are presented in the brackets. ***, ** and
* indicates p-values at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. We control for firm fixed effects and year effects
in the second stage estimations. Detailed definition of the variables are given in Table 1.
Stage 1 Stage 2
without firm controls with firm controls
(1) (2) (3)
Div syn 125.757*** 134.764***
(23.913) (36.339)
Borr risk 36.048*** 36.437***
(2.566) (3.752)
Borr risk ×Div syn -12.101*** -12.903***
(2.233) (3.257)
Collateral dum 17.920** 17.329
(8.550) (12.637)
Covenant dum -16.724* -17.008
(8.712) (11.817)
Log amount -2.889 -2.87
(2.860) (4.317)
Log maturity -2.667 -2.678
(4.969) (7.294)
Lenders -0.226 -0.264
(0.350) (0.541)
GDP growtht−1 -2.906*** -2.856*
(1.126) (1.579)
Log GDPPCt−1 -0.001** -0.001
(0.000) (0.001)
M/Bt−1 0.005* 0.453
(0.003) (0.522)
Tangibilityt−1 0.119 24.918
(0.106) (45.643)
Log assett−1 0.572*** 44.223**
(0.020) (17.603)
Leveraget−1 -0.336***
(0.051)
EBITDA assett−1 0.518**
(0.251)
Inverse mills 14.799 117.979**
(17.840) (46.506)
Firm-year obs. 3,390 1,051 1,051
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Table 8: Controlling for selection bias in accessing syndicated loans
The dependent variable in the estimations is the weighted average all in drawn spread for the
borrower in year t. Borr risk is the average rating across the three rating agencies. Issue rating
provided by each agency is treated as an ordinal variable which takes a value between 1 and 22,
where 1 refers to AAA rated firm and 22 refers to D rated firm. Div syn takes the value of 1
if the banks in the syndicate are a mix of domestic and foreign banks and 0 if it is exclusively
foreign banks. Robust standard errors clustered at firm-level are presented in the brackets. ***,
** and * indicates p-values at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. We control for firm fixed effects and
year effects in the second stage estimations. Detailed definition of the variables are given in
Table 1.
Stage 1 Stage 2
without firm controls with firm controls
(1) (2) (3)
Div syn 44.053** 47.031**
(19.936) (19.890)
Borr risk 27.690*** 28.200***
(2.471) (2.489)
Borr risk ×Div syn -3.827** -4.132**
(1.847) (1.844)
Collateral dum 12.681* 12.408*
(7.302) (7.280)
Covenant dum -30.029*** -32.591***
(8.062) (8.093)
Log amount 3.283 2.947
(2.578) (2.580)
Log maturity -2.077 -2.831
(4.541) (4.534)
Lenders 0.011 0.067
(0.313) (0.313)
GDP growtht−1 -1.529 -1.512
(1.080) (1.078)
Log GDPPCt−1 14.033 13.962
(14.530) (14.595)
M/Bt−1 0.000 0.022
(0.000) (0.055)
Tangibilityt−1 0.497*** -38.837
(0.068) (46.405)
Log assett−1 0.127*** 12.232
(0.013) (10.002)
EBITDA assett−1 0.488*
(0.264)
Leveraget−1 0.002
(0.004)
Inverse mills -9.782 8.638
(44.425) (91.866)
Firm-year obs. 11,616 832 832
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A Appendix
Table A1: Country-wise statistics
The table provides the list of 31 countries and the number of firm-year observations from the
respective country in the estimation sample.
Country No of Obs. Country No of Obs.
Argentina 38 Luxembourg 24
Australia 38 Mexico 72
Bermuda 18 Netherlands 63
Brazil 55 Norway 21
Canada 525 Philippines 19
Chile 68 Poland 10
China 45 Russia 93
Finland 15 Singapore 20
France 44 South Africa 21
Germany 50 South Korea 34
Hong Kong SAR 43 Spain 17
India 35 Sweden 27
Indonesia 26 Switzerland 72
Ireland 49 United Kingdom 362
Israel 10 United Arab Emirates 22
Japan 36 Total 1,972
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Table A2: Correlations of key variables
The table provides pairwise correlation of the variables used in the study.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
(1) Spread 1.00
(2) Borr risk 0.69 1.00
(3) Sub inv 0.61 0.82 1.00
(4) Div syn -0.15 -0.16 -0.14 1.00
(5) Collateral dum 0.47 0.53 0.51 -0.15 1.00
(6) Covenant dum 0.07 0.15 0.14 -0.02 0.17 1.00
(7) Log amount -0.19 -0.26 -0.24 0.16 -0.05 -0.01 1.00
(8) Log maturity 0.08 0.12 0.14 -0.06 0.18 0.05 0.00 1.00
(9) Lenders -0.30 -0.28 -0.26 0.30 -0.23 0.04 0.43 -0.06 1.00
(10) GDP growth -0.09 0.01 0.05 -0.13 -0.05 0.02 -0.12 0.03 0.00 1.00
(11) Log GDPPC 0.03 -0.06 -0.08 0.21 0.16 0.09 0.33 0.00 -0.01 -0.37 1.00
(12) Leadbank Eqtoasst 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.08 0.08 -0.04 0.03 -0.02 -0.06 0.07 1.00
(13) Leadbank Lnasset 0.11 0.09 0.03 -0.18 0.07 0.04 0.14 0.10 -0.04 -0.03 0.06 -0.18 1.00
(14) Leadbank NIM -0.24 -0.12 -0.08 0.12 -0.09 0.08 -0.09 -0.13 0.12 0.02 -0.16 0.53 -0.28 1.00
(15) M/B 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.08 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 1.00
(16) Tangibility -0.07 -0.06 -0.09 -0.05 -0.03 -0.12 -0.14 0.01 -0.08 -0.02 -0.09 -0.09 -0.15 0.02 0.04 1.00
(17) EBITDA asset -0.07 -0.08 -0.04 -0.16 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.07 0.01 0.10 -0.10 -0.03 0.09 0.00 -0.03 0.00 1.00
(18) Log asset -0.32 -0.52 -0.47 0.04 -0.27 -0.15 0.58 -0.06 0.37 -0.10 0.08 -0.16 0.20 -0.11 0.04 -0.01 -0.04 1.00
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